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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AND STATE CONTROL
IRVING STEINHARDT*
INTRODUCTION
Christian Science was "discovered" by Mary Baker Eddy in 1866.1
The movement had its nucleus in Massachusetts and from there it spread
to all the states in the Union, and ultimately to all corners of the world. A
recent tabulation indicates that there arc approximatcly 2400 Christian
Science Churches and Societies in the United States.2
The tenets of the religion are found solely in the writings of Mrs. Eddy,
particularly in the book entitled Science and Health, with the Key to the
Scriptures.3 This work, the cornerstone of the Christian Science faith, is
both an exposition of the theology of Christian Science 4 and a textbook
for practitioners and teachers.5 "The Key to the Scriptures" is Mrs. Eddy's
interpretation of certain portions of the Bible.6
The philosophy of Mrs. Eddy is based on a simple idealism: nothing
exists but the spirit of God. This sole reality is also synonymous with
"Life," "Mind," "Soul," "Good," "Truth," and "Love." Nlaterial substance
and the things known as sin, death, disease, suffering, and pain are not
real. They are merely delusions of mortal material mind and, contrary
to ordinary human belief, they do not exist. These errors can be rooted
out and destroyed by Truth, spiritually discerned.
The Christian Science practitioners are specially trained church mem-
bers who apply this Christian Science doctrine by means of audible and
silent "argument" to aid those who are afflicted with some supposed mental
or physical ailment, injury or disease. The practitioners must fulfill the
requirements set by the Mother Church, The First Church of Christ,
Scientist, in Boston. Their names, addresses, and telephone numbers are
* B.S. 1948, Massachusetts Institute of Technology LL.B., 1952, Harvard University;
Member of District of Columbia and Florida Bars.
1. The published biographies on Mrs. Eddy are numerous. Works such as SELLERS,
PRIVATE LIFE OF MARY BAKER EDDY (1935), are extremely unfavorable, even to the
point of scurrilousness. On the other hand, the official and Church-approved books
such as POWELL, MARY BAKER EDDY (1931), and BArEs and DirTEMORE, MARY BAKEREDDY (1932), are overly sympathetic. For a comparatively objective account see
DAKIN, MRS. EDDY (1932).
2. The Christian Science journal, Feb., 1953.
3. Published by the Christian Science Publishing Society, Boston, Mass.
4. Id., cc. 1-1X, pp. 1-341.
5. Id., c. XI1, pp. 362-442.
6. Id., p. 501.
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listed in the Christian Science Journal, a monthly publication; and they
may charge a fee for their services. 7
Thus, with Christian Science, belief takes on the form of action, and
in a field which is generally considered to be outside the sphere of spiritual
activity. ("The ordinary church merely attempts to preach the gospel.
The Christian Science Church preaches the gospel and heals the sick." 8 )
It is this application of doctrine in a field which is usually considered to
be beyond the scope of religious activity, and particularly in an area where
the state exercises regulatory police powers, which gives rise to most of the
legal problems of the church and its members.
However, this should not obscure the very important fact that Christian
Science is not just a school of medicine, but primarily a faith whose mem-
bers number thousands of devout worshippers, sincerely and firmly believing
in Christian Science, not merely as a method of healing, but as a moral
guide and a divine faith. It is also obvious that the practibe of Christian
Science is so inextricably connected with religous doctrine and dogma and
so distinctly remote from any secular theory or school that it is a fallacy of
definition not to consider it a form of religious practiceY Unfortunately,
some courts have failed to recognize this.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE AND THE PRACTICE OF M\EDICINE ACTS
The medical practice acts of the various states presented a serious
impediment to the growth of Christian Science practice. Every state has
such an act and all the acts are similar. They usually state what constitutes
the practice of medicine; they set out the educational, training, and other
requirements necessary for a license to practice medicine; and they also con-
tain penal provisions for failing to comply with the act.'0
The numerous indictments of Christian Scientists and others under
these acts around the turn of the century and in the early 1900's gave rise
to a rash of decisions in which the courts attempted to define the position
of Christian Scientists under the various acts.
Presently the statutes of every state in the Union, with the exception
of Alabama, Iowa, Mississippi, and Montana have specific provisions,
directly or indirectly, exempting Christian Scientists from the provisions of
the medical practice acts;" so a study of these early cases would seem
academic. However, since most of the cases either directly or indirectly
7. The Christian Science Journal, Feb. 1953, lists approximately 8,500 Christian
Science practitioners in the United Siates.
8. In re First Church of Christ, Scientist, 205 Pa. 543, 544, 55 Atl. 536, 537(1903).
9. Whenever the phrase "Christian Science practice" or "practice of Christian
Science" is used, it means the mind healing activities of the practitioners as distinguished
from the passive religious worship of the ordinary members of the Church.
10. For typical statutory provisions see FLA. STAT. § 458.01 et seq. (1951).
11. A compilation of these provisions is to be found in Table of Legal Provisions
Upholding Freedom in Religion, Health, Education. (Christian Science Publishing
Society) pp. 12-27.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
were concerned with constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, the
principles involved are pertinent to contemporary problems of the rights
of Christian Scientists under the Constitution of the United States, 12 and
particularly under the various state constitutions.
Faced with the same problem, the highest state courts of both Nebraska
and Ohio decided that the practice of Christian Science was within the
comprehension of the medical practice act of their respective states. How-
ever, the approach used by each court was widely divergent, and the two
cases illustrate a fundamental difference in judicial attitude toward the
functions of a civil court in making ecclesiastical ajudications.
In State v. Buswell15 the defendant, a Christian Science practitioner,
was indicted for practicing medicine without a license. He was acquitted
after the judge charged the jury that the defendant "could only be found
guilty if he practiced medicine, surgery, and obstetrics as these terms are
usually and generally understood."
The state took exception to the charge and appealed. The defendant
contended that any other construction of the statue would violate his con-
stitutional right to freedom of conscience, 14 and also the provisions of the
enabling act which provides that "perfect toleration of religious sentiment
shall be secured and no inhabitant of said state shall be molested in person
or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship."' 5
The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected this contention by deciding that
Christian Science practice involves no question of religious worship or duty.
Chief Justice Ryan cited no legal authority but used the Bible itself. Noting
that the defendant relied upon the Bible as his authority, the court stated:
"It will not therefore be amiss to refer to it for auborities applicable in his
case."' 0  Pointing out that Christian Science practitioners accepted com-
pensation for their ministrations, the court then cited the examples of
Simon Magus' T and Gehazi, servant of Elisha,' 8 as authority for the proposi-
12. U. S. CONST. AI'IEND. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. ."; U. S. CossT. AMEND.
XIV, § 1: "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law .... ." Since the cases under discussion arose before the Supreme
Court decided that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the states from abridging
religious freedom, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), or from establishing religion,
McCollum v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1948); Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1 (1943), they did not present any issues of religious freedom or establishment
under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, they do represent judicial opinion on the
general constitutional problems involved and are therefore germane.
13. 40 Neb. 158, 58 N.W. 728 (1894).
14. NEB. CONST. § 4, Art. 1: 'All persons have a natural and indefensible right
to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience."
15. Neb. Enabling Act, sec. 4, 13 Stat. 47 (1864).
16. State v. Buswell, 40 Neb. 158, 166, 58 N.W. 728, 731 (1894).
17. Simon Magus, after being converted to Christianity, offered money to the
apostles in return for the gift of the giving of the Holy Ghost by the laying on of hands,
to which request Peter replied, "Thy money perish with thee, for thou has thought that
the gift of God may be purchased with money." Apostles, c. VIII.
18. Cehazi, servant of Elisha, took talents of silver and changes of raiments which
his master had refused for curing Naaman's leprosy. For this Gehazi suffered his
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tion that "the exercise of the art of healing for compensation whether
exacted as a fee or expected as a gratuity cannot be classed as an act of
worship. Neither is it the performance of a religious duty .. The indict-
ment involved no question of sentiment nor of religious practice or duty." 19
The court concluded that the instruction given was erroneous and that
the defendant was engaged in the treating of physical ailments for com-
pensation .20
Although the Nebraska court probably reached a correct result, the
technique employed was unsound in its reasoning, unwarranted by sound
authority, and in the light of the Everson and MeCollum cases 21 may
possibly be thought of as an establishment of religion prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
First, the court's reasoning implies that whatever actions or beliefs the
Bible forbids, either directly or by interpretation, are not religious. If this
is correct, a belief in or practice of Mohammedanism or Buddhism is not a
religious belief or practice. According to the commonly accepted definitions
of religion this proposition is absurd. Even if the express language of the
court is disregarded and the opinion is read as defining Christian Science
practice merely as an un-Christian activity, this conclusion too is debatable. 2
However, any discussion of theological theory or argument should have
been bypassed by the court in view of the traditional hesitancy of most
American civil courts to make ecclesiastical adjudications. 23 Although there
were cases to the contrary,24 sound contemporary authority indicated that
civil courts were prohibited from deciding questions of religious doctrine
and dogma. 23
Finally, if this case were decided the same way at the present time it
would present the serious question, in the light of Everson and McCollum,
of whether such a determination by a state court was prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is not inconceivable that the Supreme Court
may be moved by the bizarre spectacle of a civil court interpreting the
Bible so as to hold that such adjudication by a civil court defining what is
religious or Christian is pro tanto an establishment of religion, and hence
invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Faced with the same problem as Nebraska, the Supreme Court of Ohio
reached the same result in State v. Marble. 6  In that case also, the defend-
master's curse and "went out from his presence a leper as white as snow." II Kings, C. 5.
19. State v. Buswell, 40 Neb. 158, 169, 58 N.W. 728, 732 (1894).
20. Cf. Smith v. People, 51 Colo. 270, 117 Pac. 612 (1911).
21. Note 12, supra.
22. It is certainly not fanciful to categorize Christian Science practitioners as agents
of the church performing religious duties lust as priests, ministers and pastors are.
I lardly anyone would characterize the rendering of the services by the latter for compen-
sation as un-Christian.
23. See Partin v. Tucker, 126 Fla. 817, 172 So. 891 (1937).
24. Watson v, Carvin, 54 Mo. 353 (1871).
25. Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 (U. S. 1871).
26. 72 Ohio St. 21, 73 N.E. 1063 (1905).
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ant, a Christian Science practitioner, was convicted of practicing medicine
without a license in violation of the statute.2 7  His conviction was affirmed
by the court. The defendant made the same arguments that were urged in
the Buswell case: (1) his practice was not within the statute, and (2) the
statute as applied to him was an abridgement of his right of worship under
the Ohio Constitution."
The court constfued the statute as embracing Christian Science prac-
titioners within its tenns. 29 The constitutional objections were met, not
by rejecting Christian Science practice as a valid form of religious activity,
but by deciding that Christian Science practice was a proper subject for
regulation pursuant to the police power of the state. The court recognized
that a delicate balance exists between the exercise of the police power of
the state and the constitutional guaranties of individual liberties: "The
power is subject to the express state constitutional limitations and to the
inhibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States . . . and the implied limitation that every exercise of the
police power must be reasonable."30
The court recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in the
preservation of the life of the individual who is sick and needs the services
of a physician; furthermore, the state has an interest in safeguarding the
public against the spread of contagious diseases; and those objectives can
best be obtained by such regulatory legislation as was in issue. To the
objection that a person should have the right to choose his own type of
treatment the court replied:
While the state may not deem it wise to go the extent of
requiring the individual to avail himself of the services of a physi-
cian, yet it may not wish to hasten his death and so to transfer to
itself the burden of supplanting those dependent upon him by
making it possible for him to employ an empiric.3 '
The court concluded that the practice of Christian Science, though
it be a religious act, may be regulated because it is inimical to the public
welfare.8
2
27. Ohio General Code, § 1286: "A person is practicing medicine . . . who
shall prescribe or shall recommend for a fee for like use any drug or medicine or appli-
ance or application or operation or treatment of whatever nature for the care or relief of
any wound, fracture, or bodily injury, infirmity or disease,"
28. OIo CO ST., § 7: "All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of his own conscience, nor shall any interference
with the rights of conscience be permitted."
29. Under a previous statute enacted in 1896 which was less sweeping in its terms("who shall prescribe ... any drug or medicine or other agency .. " 92 Ohio Laws 47),
the statute was held not to apply to osteopaths, State v. Liffring, 61 Ohio St. 39, 5
N.E. 168 (1899), or to Christian Scientists, Evans v. State, 9 Ohio Dec. 222 (1889).
It seems that the court in Marble was sound in holding that the broadening of the
statute by the addition of the words "treatment of whatever nature whatsoever." Note
27 supra, was intended to embrance the practice of Christian Science.
30. State v. Marble, 72 Ohio St, 21, 33, 73 N.E. 1063, 1065 (1905).
31. State v. Marble, 72 Ohio St. 21, 36, 73 N.E. 1063, 1067 (1905).
32. Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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In contrast to the Buswell decision there can be no serious objections
raised to the judicial technique used in the Marble case, and on a com-
parative basis the latter is the best, reasoned and most lucid of all the
decisions on the subject.
The remaining cases were decided simply by holding that Christian
Scientists and others who healed without the use of drugs were not
practicing medicine within the meaning of the particular statute involved.83
PARENTAL AUTHORITY VERSUS THE STATE
Child Welfare
It has generally been established that the state, as parens patriae, may
legislate for the protection of children.34 When state regulation takes on
the form of requiring medical attention to be furnished to an infant, or
establishing a physical examination or vaccination as a prerequisite to
school attendance, the objections of parents who are Christian Scientists
are obvious.
The courts have generally sustained such legislation despite the argu-
ment that it abrogates religious liberties of parents and children.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Jacobson v. Massachusetts
held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit a state from com-
pelling its citizens to submit to vaccination. The decision did not expressly
decide that the state could exercise its power when the objection to vaccina-
tion was based on religious belief. However, the state courts, when con-
fronted with the issue, have usually sustained the state's action under the
particular state constitution involved and under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, citing the Jacobson case.36 In Anderson v. State3 l7 the major ground
for these decisions was cogently expressed by Justice Townsend:
The ill effects of contagious disease and its power to wipe out
entire populations is a matter of history. Many of these scourges
of the past have been completely dissipated by the preventive
methods of medical science. The purpose of the legislature in
passing Code Supp. Sec. 32-94 was to prevent the spread of these
33. State v. Miller, 216 Iowa 806, 249 N.W.141 (1933); Bennett v. Ware, 4 Ga.
App. 293 (1908); State v. Mylod, 20 R.I. 632, 10 Atl. 753 (1898).
34. State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901); People v. Ewer, 141 N.Y.
129, 36 N.E. 4 (1894).
35. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
36. Anderson v. State, 84 Ga. App. 255, 65, S.E.2d 848 (1951); Dunham v. Board
of Education, 154 Ohio St. 169, 96 N.E.2d 413 (1951); Mosier v. Barren County
Board, 308 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (1948); Sadlock v. Board of Education, 137 N.J.L.
85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948). See In re Whitmore, 47 N.Y.S.2d 143, 146 (1944); State
v. Drew, 89 N.H. 54, 57; 192 Atl. 629, 632 (1937). In several of the above cases the
vaccination requirement took on the form of a regulation promulgated by the Board
of Education. In some of the cases it was argued that a statute giving the board the
power to issue the regulation was either an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to an administrative board; or else an unconstitutional assumption of such
power in the absence of any statute. This argument was rejected in every instance.
However, in State v. Burdage, 95 Wis. 390, 70 N.W. 347 (1897), the objecting parent
prevailed on the ground the promulgation of the regulation was an invalid assumption
of legislative power by the board. No issue of religious liberty was raised in that case.
37. 84 Ga. App. 259, 65 S.E.2d 848 (1951).
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diseases not only for the protection of those actually inmunized
but for the protcction of those with whom they might come in
contact. The refusal of the defendants then to have their children
vaccinated here amounted to a transgression of the rights of others
... A person's rights to exercise religious freedom which may be
manifested by acts ceases when it overlaps and transgresses the
rights of the others. Evcry one's rights must be excrciscd with due
regard to the rights of others. . . . Liberty of conscience is one
thing. License to endanger the lives of others by practices contrary
to statutes passed for public safety and in reliance upon modern
medical knowledge is another. Thc validity of the statute is not
questioned, and the wisdom of the legislative enactment is not a
matter for the decision of either this court or any individual citi-
zen.
38
The court was unclear when it talked in terms of the rights of the
majority being transgressed by the rights of a minority, for it is difficult
to perceive precisely what rights are being transgressed. Surely the public
has not absolute right to protection from the spread of disease. However,
the general import of the opinion is clear: whenever the state enacts legisla-
tion that is reasonably designed to secure the health of its citizens, the
religious practices of a minority must yield if those practices tend to negative
the efficacy of the legislation.3
The vaccination requirements have been justified because they not
only protect the person being vaccinated but the general public as well.
When the sole risk involved is the health or lives of children, most
states have gone even further and imposed upon parents the statutory duty
of providing medical attendance for their children.
The constitutionality of such legislation was in issue in People v. Pier-
son.4 0  In that case the defendant refused to allow his child to be treated
by a physician because his religious faith led him to believe that the child
would get well by prayer. lie was indicted and convicted for violation of
the statute which made it a misdemeanor to wilfully omit or fail to furnish
a minor with "food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance." 4' At the trial
the judge charged that no man can be permitted to set up his religious
belief as a defense to the commission of an act which is in plain violation of
the statute. The defendant took exception to the charge and appealed.
The New York Court of Appeals construed the words "medical attend-
38. Anderson v. State, 84 Ga. App. 259, 264, 65 S.E.2d 848, 851 (1951).
39. The Supreme Court has indicated that in some instances a state may not
transgress the right to religious worship unless the worship present a clear and present
danger to the interests of the state. See the discussion of the Barnette case infra. There
is doubt, however, that that standard will be applied in its literal sense to the vaccination
issue. The efficacy of vaccination lies in the fact that it is preventive. To force a state
to wait until a communicable disease has reached the stage when the danger to the
lives of its citizens is imminent would in effect prevent the state from protecting the
lives of its citizens. See State v. Armstrong, 39 Wash.2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952).
40. 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
41. N. Y. PENAL CODE § 288.
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ance" as meaning that furnished by a regularly qualified physician, and
then discussed the constitutional objections as follows:
The peace and safety of the state involve the protection of the
lives and health of its children. Full and free enjoyment of religious
worship is guaranteed,4 2 but acts which are not worship are not.
A person cannot under the guise of religious belief practice polyg-
amy and still be protected from our statutes constituting the crime
of bigamy. He cannot, under the belief or profession of belief
that he should be relieved from the care of children, be excused
from punishment for slaying those who have been born to him.
Children when born into this world are utterly helpless, having
neither the power to care for and protect themselves. They are
exposed to all the ills to which flesh is heir and require careful
nursing, and at times, when danger is present, the help of an
experienced physician. But the law of nature, as well as the coin-
mon law, devolves upon the parents the duty of caring for the
young in sickness and health, and of doing whatever may be neces-
sary for their care, maintenance, and preservation, including med-
ical attendance if necessary, and an omission to do this is a public
wrong which the state under its police powers may prevent . ..
We are aware that there are people who believe that the Divine
power may be invoked to heal the sick, and that faith is all that is
required. . . .But sitting as a court of law for the purpose of con-
struing and determining the meaning of the statute, we have
nothing to do with the variances in religious beliefs and have no
power to determine which is correct.43 We place no limitations
upon the power of the mind over the body, the power of faith to
dispel diseases or the power of the Supreme Being to heal the sick.
We merely declare the law as given us by the legislature. 44
Similar considerations led the Supreme Court of South Dakota, in
Streich v. Board of Education,45 to uphold a physical examination regula-
tion promulgated by a local board of education. The plaintiff had brought
a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to admit his children
to the public school after he had refused to allow them to submit to a
physical examination and questionnaire. The upper court affirmed the
action of the trial court in denying the plaintiff's petition for mandamus.
On appeal the plaintiff contended in his brief that the board was
exceeding its power and that the regulation as applied to himself denied
him liberty of religious worship.
The court met the first contention by stating that an administrative
body has all the implied police powers necessary to fulfill its function. The
plaintiff abandoned his religious freedom argument on the oral argument
42. N. Y. CoNsT., Art. I, § 3: "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious pro-
fession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed in
this state to all mankind ...but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practice inconsistent with the
peace and safety of this state."
43. Contra attitude in State v. Buswell, 40 Neb. 158, 58 N.W. 728 (1894).
44. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 212, 68 N.E. 243, 246 (1903).
45. 34 S.D. 169, 147 N.W. 779 (1914).
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but there was no doubt that the court rejected it. Justice Whiting noted
that plaintiff's counsel "upon the oral argument of this cause repeatedly
assured this court that the question before us was in no sense a religious
question but is entirely separate and distinct from anyone's religious belief.
We agree fully with counsel as certainly the school boards of our land
should not base the same upon the tenets of any particular religious sect
or sects."
46
In Prince v. Commonwealth'7 the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the power of the state to exert its authority over the activities of
children despite the fact that state regulation in that area hampered the
religious activities of both the parent and the child. The Court sustained
a state child-labor law prohibiting selling by children on the public streets.
The appellant's ward, a child of nine, had been helping appellant distribute
religious literature on the streets. The Court held that the statute as
applied to appellant was not violative of freedom of regilion nor a denial
of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Rutledge noted that "the family
itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest"4  and cited with
approval People v. Pierson.4" He reiterated the principle illustrated by the
Pierson and Streich cases when he stated: "The state's authority over
children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults."50
Thus, when the welfare of their children is the interest that is in issue,
Christian Scientists may generally expect the courts to deny relief from the
application of legislative or state action despite the fact that such regula-
tion is offensive to the religious beliefs of both parent and child.
Education of Children
It would seem that the teaching of compulsory hygiene and health
courses in public schools would be so repugnant to the religious beliefs of
Christian Scientists that the clash would result in a fair amount of liti-
gation. Surprisingly, there is not a single instance of persuasive authority
which deals precisely with the problem. No doubt one of the major reasons
for the lack of cases on the subject is the general prcfcrence of the Christian
Scientists to secure their rights through legislation rather than resort to the
courts. Twelve states have provided for students' statutory exemptions from
health or hygiene courses if such courses conflict with their religious
beliefs. " '
The only authorities that bear any relation to the problem are the
46. Strcich v. Board of Education, 34 S.D. 169, 182, 147 N.W. 779, 783 (1914)
47. 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
48. Prince v. Commonwealth, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943).
49. Note 40, supra.
50. Prince v. Commonwealth, 322 U.S. 158, 168 (1943).
51. Cal., Conn., Ind., Iowa, Mich., Miss., N. Y, Okla., Ore., It. I., Utah, Wash.,
Wis. The complete texts of the statutory provisions are found in The Table of Legal
Provisions, note 14 supra, pp. 69-102.
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McCollum case,51 the Barnette case,53 and the conflicting state decisions
directed to the issue of whether Bible reading in public schools violated con-
stitutional prohibitions against establishment of religion and sectarian
instruction in public school and infringed upon constitutional guarantees
of religious freedom. 54
The Bible-reading cases have only slight relevance to the issue and are
not conclusive in any sense. There are several important distinctions.
First, in most of the Bible-reading cases there was no active religious instruc-
tion; and the practice usually involved was a reading of a portion of the
Bible as an opening exercise. The problem under discussion is one of active
instruction. Second, the reading of the Bible obviously involves a religious
subject; the teaching of health and hygiene courses is normally thought of
as secular instruction. Finally, requiring Bible reading in public schools
is not an exercise of the police power of the state; requiring instruction in
health and hygiene is more nearly within the police power. These are the
factors that may influence a court to hold that any prohibition of, or
exemption from Bible-reading, does not extend to health or hygiene courses.
In the McCoIIum case the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the use of state buildings for
religious instruction in the three major faiths. This was held to be, among
other things, an establishment of religion now forbidden by the Fourteenth
Amendment. If the fight for exemption from health courses is carried to
the Supreme Court, how far will McCollum control the question? The
major distinction in the two situations is the type of instruction involved.
Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in McCollum is anticipatory of
this problem. He agreed with the majority that formal and explicit instruc-
tion in "creed and catechism and ceremonial" should be prohibited as an
establishment of religion, but he doubts the wisdom of enunciating a
general rule forbidding religious instruction in public schools because of
the highly difficult job in many instances of separating the secular from
the religious. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Barnette also raised the
problem: "Or is the court to enter the old controversy between science
and religion by unduly defining the limits within which a state may experi-
ient with its school curricula?"' ' 5
However, should the health and hygiene issue ever arise, it is almost
impossible to conceive that any member of the court would accept any
characterization of the teaching of the ordinary health course as a species
of religious instruction and thus condemn it as an establishment of
52. McCollum v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1948).
53. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
54. For a complete discussion of the litigation involving Bible reading in public
schools see JoHNsON AND YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, C. IV (1948). The
most recent case involving this issue is Doremus v. Board of Education, 5 N.J. 435, 75
A.2d 880 (1950), 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (appeal dismissed-no case or controversy).55. Board of Education v. Barnette, 310 U.S. 624, 659 (1943).
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religion. 56 Aside from this, the instruction may be sustained on the ground
that to require it is a valid exercise of the power of the state reasonably
designed to safeguard the health of its citizens.
Most probably the issue, if presented at all, will not be in the form of
a demand for total prohibition, but rather as a request for exemption from
such courses. The Barnette case indicates that Christian Scientists may
have a valid constitutional objection to the teaching of health courses to
their children. In that case the Supreme Court of the United States upheld
the right of children of Jehovah's Witnesses to refuse to salute the American
flag even though it was required by a local school board. The court indi-
cated in Barnette that no state could compel an individual to participate
in a ceremony that was odious to his religious belief. In the course of the
majority opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson intimated that the "clear and present
danger" standard as first enunciated in respect to freedom of speech was also
applicable in respect to religious liberty and that a state could not infringe
upon rights of religious worship unless the worship presented "grave and
immnediate danger" to interests which the state may lawfully protect. If
the present court can be convinced that lack of health training to a minority
presents no such danger to the preservation of the health of the com-
munity, the Christian Scientists may very well score a victory.
At the beginning of this section it was stated that no persuasive
authority could be found dealing directly with the problem. Yet the Coin-
nittee on Publication of the Mother Church 57 and others58 seem to cite
the case of I-lardwick v. Board of School Trustees0 as declaratory of the
proposition that a parent may refuse to allow his children to be taught
secular subjects if they interfere with the parents' or the child's religious
beliefs. Because of the remarkable language and judicial method employed
by Justice Hart, the case probably is not authoritative to any great degree,
and in the last analysis is probably an aberration in the field of case law.
The litigation revolved about the expulsion of the plaintiff's children
from a public school when they refused to participate in ballroom dancing
classes which were prescribed for the course in physical education. The
plaintiff thereupon brought a petition for a writ of mandamus directed to
the school board to compel reinstatement of the plaintiff's children. Tile
school board demurred generally and specially to the petition. The demurrer
was sustained and judgment entered against the plaintiff who appealed to
the District Court of Appeals. Justice Hart reversed the judgment of the
lower court.
56. If the health instruction shades off into the area of biology which may in turn
involve instruction in such controversial matters as the theory of evolution, then, of
course, the difficulty foreseen by Jackson and Frankfurter will exist. However, a pure
hygiene course would seem clearly secular.
57. See The Table of Legal Provisions, note 14 supra, at 119.
58. See JOHNSON AND YOST, SEPARATION OF CiiURC AND STATE, 61 (1948).
59. 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 Pac. 49 (1921).
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One of the grounds for the demurrer was that the complaint was "...
uncertain in that it does not appear to what church discipline the plaintiff
submits nor in what way the mattcr of said children so dancing conflicts
with said conscientious scruples and religious beliefs and principles either
of said plaintiff or of said children of said plaintiff."60
The Board's argument for requiring an allegation of memnbership ill an
organized religion was as follows:
At the trial of such a case all the plaintiff would have to do
would be to prove that certain things were done or taught in the
schools and theni testify arbitrarily that such things were against his
conscience or religion and he could have them prohibited.
How could the people or school authorities disprove the testimony
of a man who stated that anything done in the schools was
offensive or contrary to his religion? If this complaint is good,
another stating that mathematics or chemistry or the letters or
history taught was contrary to anyone's religious beliefs would be
equally good.61
Justice Hart failed to discuss the issues thus raised-of difficulty of
proof of religious belief and its hampcring effect upon school administra-
tion-but simply decided that the guaranties of the constitutions of Cali-
fornia 2 and the United States are not only applicable to religious organiza-
tions or to persons actually affiliated with such organizations, but also apply
to any person having religious convictions, irrespective of whether he is a
member of any church or any religious society.
After asserting this flat and sweeping proposition the judge imme-
diately shifted the issue to another ground:
The question involved in the controversy, howevcr, is not
nccessarily one of religion, or whether the dances mentioned in
the complaint and to which the plaintiff is opposed are disap-
proved of by the religious organization to which he belongs, if
indeed he is a member of any such organization. It is as much a
question of morals."
Then in a long and eloquent discourse, more befitting a seventeenth-century
pulpit than a twentieth-century bench, Justice Hart stated that the teaching
of the dances in question-the waltz, the two-step and the polka-is regarded
by many "as tending in no small degree to develop in the young thoughts
of propensities incompatible with that higher concept of morality which is
a prime desideratum of life" or, if it is not regarded as wrong per se, many
perceive in the exercise "an element of infatuation so overwhelming in its
60. Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 Pac. 49 (1920).
61. -lardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 700, 205 Pac. 49, 50
(1921). Aside from the difficulty of proof, school administration in this area may
further be hampered if a court is constitutionally prohibited from inquiring whether an
alleged religious belief actually exists. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
62. CAL. CONST., Art. I, § 4. The provisions are exactly the same as those in the
N. Y. Constitution, note 4 su pra.
63. Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 708, 205 Pac. 49, 54
(1921).
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effect upon the undeveloped judgment of minors as to distract their minds,
to their irremediable detriment from the more important and serious
matters of both spiritual and temporal concern." 4
The judge concludes that these views may be held by anyone:
Indeed there may be persons (and undoubtedly there are
many who have absolutely no religious conviction based upon the
teachings of the Good Book-in fact, even atheists and agnostics,
who are conscientiously opposed to their children engaging in
dancing in any form or under any circumstances upon the honest
belief that such performances are not conducive to the moral uplift
of the young.
rrhe judge stated:
Thus it will be readily understood that, as before declared,
the important proposition involved in the controversy is no more
a question of religious liberty than it is a question of morals. 5
In view of the quoted language, the main ground of decision seems to
be that a secular subject may be objectionable if it offends the moral sense
of some of the community. Although conceivably the opinion may be read
as containing an alternative ground that the instruction infringed upon
religious liberty, the bypassing of the issues raised by the demurrer and the
shift into, and heavy emphasis upon, questions of morals and morality so
far qualified the religious liberty issue that it would be difficult to contend
that this case is strong authority for the proposition that a parent may
demand exemption of his child from secular instruction if it offends both
his and his child's beliefs.
Considering the lack of direct authority cited in the opinion and the
strong condemnatory language used, the Hardwick decision seems to be a
case of a judge's personal moral indignation transformed into case law;
and the case is probably not authoritative precedent for any principle.
Thus, if the issue of exemption from hygiene courses arises in the courts,
the field may be considered relatively unblemished by any direct prior
persuasive authority.
STATE CONTROL OF CHURCH AFFAIRS
Despite the general reluctance of Christian Scientists to participate in
litigation, a bitter controversy in the 1920's, concerning the scope of the
power that the directors of the Mother Church retained over the trustees of
the Christian Science Publishing Society, sent several of the parties scurrying
into court to vindicate their rights. The litigation resulted in two decisions
that firmly established the authority of the board of directors.
The dissension centered about the meaning of certain sections of the
Church Manual and the extent to which its provisions authorized the
64. Hlardwich v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 707, 205 Pac. 49, 55
(1921).
65. Hardwich v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 706, 205 Pac. 49, 53,
54 (1921).
66. This work, authored by Mrs. Eddy, contains the church by-laws.
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directors to supervise the matter to be printed and sent out by the trustees.
During the conflict the directors singled out one of the rebellious trustees,
Rowlands, for removal, and also purported to remove Dittemore, a fellow-
member of the board of driectors. The trustees filed a bill in equity in
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts demanding that the resolu-
tion removing Rowlands be adjudged void.
The case was referred to a master who found that the directors acted
pursuant to the following power contained in the dccd of trust establishing
the Publishing Society:
The First Members, together with the directors of said church
shall have power to declare vacancies in said trusteeship for such
reasons as to them shall seem expedient.
The master's findings of law were that the power of removal was not
vested in the board of directors: the resolution was ineffectual to remove
Rowlands; and he was still a trustee. The case went up on appeal,67
By the express terms of the trust, the power was vested in both the
First Members and the board of directors. By the time of Rowlands'
removal the First Members had ceased to function as an ecclesiastical body
in the church and actually were no longer in existence. The first question
facing the court then was: Did the power of removal survive solely in
the directors? After an exhaustive examination and construction of the
deeds of trust establishing the Mother Church and the Publishing Society,
Chief justice Rugg reached an affirmative conclusion. He then went on to
decide that the adoption of the resolution removing Rowlands was a valid
exercise of the power.
In respect to the dispute concerning the directors' right of censorship
or review over published material, the master was unable to find that the
directors had the authority that they claimed. The master stated, "It was
by no means a question regarding which no honest difference of opinion
was possible."
The court decided that it could not pass on the merits of the con-
troversy because the directors honestly believed that the removal of the
defendant was necessary to the welfare of the trust:
The discretion of those possessing the power of removal when
applied in good faith is not subject to reexamination in respect to
its wisdom. The judgment of the court cannot be substituted for
the constituted authorities when fairly exercised. 6s
The court adds the following qualifications:
The power cannot be put forth maliciously, whimsically, or
capriciously. The function of the court is to determine whether
the terms of the trust have been observed, whether the proceed-
ings have been regular, whether the cause assigned is sufficient to
warrant removal, whether fair opportunity has been accorded the
67. Eustace v. Dickey, 240 Mass. 55, 132 N.E. 852 (1921).
68. Eustace v. Dickey, 240 Mass. 55, 83, 132 N.E. 852, 862 (1921).
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trustee to present his side of the matter so as to satisfy the require-
ments of natural justice.69
After thus enunciating what seem to be due process standards, the court
proceeded to apply those standards to the facts.
The master found that the directors assigned as one of the reasons for
the removal of Rowlands: He ". . evidently has other interests which
prevent him from giving sufficient time or attention to the business of the
Christian Science Publishing Society." The master found that the reason
assigned was a false one and not made in good faith. The master also
found that, even though all the trustees were equally disputing the directors'
authority, only Rowlands was singled out for removal; and he further found
that there was no opportunity for a formal hearing before removal.
Chief Justice Rugg decided that the first two factors did not void the
action of the directors because they were exercising their honest judgment
on the question of expediency. As to the requirement of a hearing, the
court added that ordinarily one whose conduct is called into question
ought to be given an opportunity to be heard in his own defense, but that
the long controversy between the directors and the trustees had brought
out clearly the points of difference between them so that a hearing was
unnecessary. In the end, therefore, the court seems to be merely paying lip
service to standards of due process; and the case in its result is another
instance of the reluctance of most American courts to apply those standards
when the powers of an autocratic form of church government are called
into question.70
That this is so seems to be affirmed by the subsequent case of the
deposed director, Dittemore.7' He was dismissed pursuant to Art. 1, § 5 of
the Church Manual: "The Christian Science Board of Directors shall
consist of five members. . . . A majority vote or the request of Mrs. Eddy
shall dismiss a member." In his opinion, Chief justice Rugg stated:
The plaintiff became a member of the board of directors in
1909. The manual with its provisions respecting removal of direc-
tors was as much a part of the governing policy of the church then
as now. He is bound by it. By accepting the office of director he
consented to removal, provided only that it was accomplished in
the manner pointed out in the Church Manual. When the validity
of an order of removal under these circumstances is challenged in
the courts the wisdom or the expediency of the removal is not
reviewed. The decision of the society or its officers acting in good
faith rendered according to their own rules is final. There is no
general right of appeal to the courts.7 2
The court decided that no hearing was required and that Dittemore's
removal was legally effectuated.
69. Ibid.
70. See Carter v. Papineau, 222 Mass. 464, Ill N.E. 358 (1916); lonacum v.
Harrington, 65 Neb. 832, 91 N.W. 886 (1902).
71. 1)ittemore v. Dickey, 249 Mass. 95, 144 N.E. 57 (1924).
72. Dittemore v. Dickey, 249 Mass. 95, 107, 144 N.E. 57, 62 (1924).
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TIese cases, representing as they do the "hands-off" attitude of the
Massachusetts court toward internal dissension in the management of the
Mother Church and its associated bodies, are solid assurance to the direc-
tors that their administration will not be hampered by recourse of aggrieved
church members to the civil tribunals.
CONCLUSION AND FORECAST
Thc litigation arising from the clash of the religious beliefs of Christian
Scientists and the exercise of the police power of the state has generally
resulted in defeat for the Christian Scientists. Quite understandably they
have then resorted to legislation to secure their rights.7  Because of this,
and because the internal authority of the church has been resoundingly
established, the amount of future litigation involving the church and its
members will probably be negligible.
In the limited area of exemption from hygiene courses, however, the
possibility of litigation seems substantial. It is rather significant to note
that the recent passage in New York of the Morgan-Flammond Act,7 4
which exempted pupils from hygiene courses, brought forth a wave of
protest from parent organizations, medical groups, 75 and from the pulpit.TC
Carl E. Willgoose of Syracuse University in a recent article thoroughly and
eloquently condemned the passage of the Act.7
It must be remembered that legislatures respond to public opinion. If
the controversy in New York is indicative of a trend of public opinion, it
may follow that other legislatures will hesitate in granting statutory exemp-
itons in this field. In such an event, a recourse to the courts may become
imperative. In the light of the recent solicitous attitude taken by the
Supreme Court of the United States with respect to religious liberties, the
course of future litigation in this area by Christian Scientists may prove
rewarding.
Finally, it should be noted that, although the state in the past has
generally been content to regulate the practice of medicine, there seems
to be a growing movement toward active participation in the medical field
on the part of municipal, state, and federal governments. Examples of
this trend are fluorination of water supplies and the proposed federal
socialized medicine program. As this new development grows it will
engender increasing friction between the powers of the state and the
religious beliefs of Christian Scientists. Out of the clash may emerge novel
legal problems to which the cases and issues discussed here may prove a
guide.
73. A testimonial to their efforts is The Table of Legal Provisions, note 11 supra,
containing hundreds of statutory provisions recognizing the rights of Christian Scientists.
74. N. Y. EDUCATION LAW, § 3204(5).
75. N. Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1951. p. 39, col. 5.
76. N. Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1951, p. 68, col. 3.
77. "Health, Welfare and Religious Freedom," 73 SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 196,(March 31, 1951).
